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This article examines a critique that has been levied against Martin Luther’s account 
of the passivity of the human agent in salvation, and his corresponding critique of 
Aristotelian and Scholastic accounts of virtue. According to Reinhard Hütter and 
Jennifer Herdt, among others, Luther’s theology of passivity is primarily the product 
of a philosophical failure to recognize that divine and human agency can be conceived 
in non-competitive terms. In what follows, I will demonstrate through close analysis 
of Luther’s arguments that this philosophical critique does not succeed in refuting 
Luther’s theology of passivity. This is because it fails to recognize that Luther’s view 
of human agency and his critique of virtue are based to a significant degree on a 
different kind of argument: namely, empirical reflection on the experience of sin, 
including especially experience of the unmasterability of sinful affections through 
discipline, habit, or effort of will. I conclude by arguing that until Christian virtue 
ethicists have reckoned with this experiential argument, they have not engaged with 
one of the strongest theological critiques of virtue-based paradigms of Christian moral 
transformation. 
Divine and Human Agency in Recent Theology 
It has become commonplace in recent theology to observe that debates about the role 
of free will in salvation are often built on what is now seen to be a basic philosophical 
error. This error is the belief that divine and human agencies must necessarily 
compete with one another on the same ontological plane. So the argument goes, it is 
in fact possible and even necessary to conceive of divine and human agency in ‘non-
contrastive’ or ‘non-competitive’ terms. God and humanity are not opponents in some 
zero-sum game; to claim that they are is to misunderstand the transcendence of the 
God who created the universe ex nihilo by placing God on the same plane as the 
creature, and to preclude any coherent account of the integrity of creaturely freedom 
or of moral responsibility. In fact, the nature of divine transcendence is such that God 
is the cause of all things in such a way that creaturely freedom and the genuine 
contingency of human action are themselves manifestations of divine causality. 
Divine grace thus does not destroy human freedom but sources, enables, and sustains 
it.  
On its own terms, this characterization of the relationship between divine and human 
agency is not an innovation. It is fundamental to the theology of Thomas Aquinas,1 
                                                 
1 As Aquinas puts it, ‘God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this 
that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous’ (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.105.5); ‘From 
this it is also evident that providence is not incompatible with freedom of will’ (Aquinas, Summa 
Contra Gentiles 73.1). On these themes see especially Summa contra Gentiles 67-77 and Summa 
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and forms of it have also been identified in Augustine,2 in Gregory of Nyssa,3 and in 
Anselm and Bernard4, among others. What has changed recently, however, has been a 
widespread promulgation and acceptance of this view of divine and human agency 
well beyond the boundaries of Thomist theology. Indeed it would seem to be 
developing into something of a standard view for academic theologians across 
confessions.5  
In this development, no contemporary theologian has been more influential than 
Kathryn Tanner.6 In the now classic discussion in God and Creation in Christian 
Theology, Tanner makes a powerful argument, grounded primarily in the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo, that the Christian concept of divine transcendence includes rather 
than competes with a belief in creaturely efficacy. According to Tanner, for God to be 
truly transcendent in relation to Creation, divine agency in the world must be 
understood to be ‘universal and immediate’, such that ‘everything non-divine must be 
talked about as existing in a relation of total and immediate dependence upon God’.7 
It follows from this that divine agency does not operate on the same ontological plane 
as creaturely agency: ‘a God who transcends the world must not be characterized… 
by a direct contrast with it… A contrastive definition [of agency] will show its failure 
to follow through on divine transcendence by inevitably bringing God down to the 
level of the non-divine to which it is opposed.’8 This in turn means that ‘creatures can 
be said to gain those qualities [of power and efficacy] not in the degree God’s agency 
is restricted, but in the degree God’s creative agency is extended to them.’9 In 
                                                                                                                                           
Theologiae I.105.5. For overviews of Aquinas on divine agency and human freedom, see Bernard 
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 94-111, and Brian 
Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 158-69, 174-8. 266-8. 
2 See e.g., Harry McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong? An Ecumenical-Theological Study of Luther’s 
Major Work, The Bondage of the Will (New York: Newman Press, 1969), 63-110; and Susannah 
Ticciati, A New Apophaticism: Augustine and the Redemption of Signs (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 62-6. 
3 See Natalie Carnes, Beauty: A Theological Engagement with Gregory of Nyssa (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2014), 105-15. 
4 For both Anselm and Bernard see McSorley, Luther, 129-34. For an interpretation of Barth that bears 
some similarities, see Adam Neder, Participation in Christ: An Entry into Karl Barth’s Church 
Dogmatics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009). 
5 In addition to those already mentioned, see Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian 
Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1988); Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting 
on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Jason Fout, 
Fully Alive: The Glory of God and the Human Creature in Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
and Theological Exegesis of Scripture (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 3-5; William C. 
Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God Went Wrong 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 111-27; Kyle Wells, Grace and Agency in Paul and 
Second Temple Judaism: Interpreting the Transformation of the Heart (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 295-301; 
John M.G. Barclay, ‘Introduction,’ in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural 
Environment, ed. John M.G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 7; Colin D. 
Miller, The Practice of the Body of Christ: Human Agency in Pauline Theology after MacIntyre 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014); and Jeremy Begbie, ‘Room of One’s Own? Music, Space, 
and Freedom,’ in Music, Modernity, and God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 145-6, 163. 
6 Herdt, Ticciati, Carnes, Begbie, Placher, Fout, Barclay, Wells, and Miller all explicitly acknowledge 
Tanner’s influence. 
7 Tanner, God and Creation, 84. 
8 Ibid., 46. 
9 Ibid., 85. 
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Tanner’s view, then, the contrastive accounts of divine and human agency that 
theologians have presupposed ‘[f]rom the time of the Reformation’10 are built upon a 
fundamental philosophical and theological mistake: ‘To exclude genuine created 
efficacy as a possible direct effect of God’s agency is to misunderstand… the nature 
of transcendence implied by the supremacy, sovereignty and holiness of God.’11  
Although the basic concept here can be understood as kind of postliberal, ‘rule’-based 
restatement of Aquinas’ position on contingency and secondary causation, it is 
Tanner’s version that has succeeded in breaking through to a wider theological 
audience. In recent theology it has been found useful for understanding a wide range 
of topics, from the theology of music, to the soteriology of St Paul, to the nature of 
artistic inspiration.12  
My interest in the present article is in one particular theological use that has been 
made of the principle of non-competitive agency in recent years: namely, as a critique 
of accounts of the life of faith that emphasize the passivity of the human agent. In 
God and Creation, Tanner argues that the theology of Martin Luther, in particular, 
with its emphasis on ‘extrospective faith, alien righteousness, and the simul iustus et 
peccator status of the faithful’, is a classic example of a theology that emphasizes 
divine sovereignty at the expense of human efficacy.13 Because Luther lacked a non-
contrastive vision of divine and human agency, the only way for him to maximize 
God’s grace was to argue that the human person contributes nothing whatsoever to 
her salvation. 
The implications of this application of the principle of non-competition to critique 
Luther’s account of soteriological passivity are substantial, both for the evaluation of 
Luther’s theology and for protestant soteriology more broadly. This article will focus 
one implication in particular. Part of what is at stake in the dispute about agency is the 
viability of a major argument in favor of virtue ethics as an ecumenical approach to 
sanctification and the Christian life. This is because the argument about agency 
appears to strike at the heart of Luther’s famous critique of Aristotelian virtue. When 
Luther asserted in the Heidelberg Disputation that ‘the righteousness of God is not 
acquired by means of acts frequently repeated, as Aristotle taught’, but rather comes 
‘without work’ to the one who ‘believes much in Christ’,14 he was arguing that the 
soteriology of justification as he found it in Paul was incompatible with soteriologies 
built around a Christianized account of the acquisition of virtue. This is because the 
latter, as he understood them, require the cooperation of the human agent in the 
acquisition and cultivation of saving righteousness, and he believed that the doctrine 
of justification by faith precludes all such cooperation. Recent advocates of virtue 
ethics have been aware of the connection between non-competitive agency and virtue-
                                                 
10 Ibid., 2. 
11 Ibid., 87. 
12 Begbie, ‘Room of One’s Own?’; Wells, Grace and Agency, 295-301, and Barclay, ‘Introduction’; 
Carnes, Beauty. 
13 Tanner, God and Creation, 115, 112. 
14 WA 1:364; LW 31:55. 
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based accounts of moral transformation. As Colin Miller puts it, ‘the eclipse of the 
virtues is implicated in the inability to conceive of a non-competitive divine-human 
cooperation.’15 Likewise, it is no accident that Luther represents the primary foil for 
the recovery of virtue that Jennifer Herdt advocates in Putting on Virtue.16 In light of 
this, the aim of the present article is to demonstrate that the widespread theological 
turn to virtue ethics in recent years has not yet taken account of one of the strongest 
traditional arguments against a virtue paradigm for understanding Christian moral 
transformation: Luther’s argument from experience. 
Luther and His Critics 
On the face of it, it is clearly true that much of Luther’s theology can be understood as 
a reflection on the unilateral character of divine grace and the corresponding passivity 
of the human agent in salvation, and to a significant degree in the Christian life as 
well. As Luther repeats over and over, what is needed is simply ‘that our works cease 
and that God alone works in us’.17 Although there are very many articulations of this 
theology of passivity in Luther’s writings,18 a particularly useful summary can be 
found in the opening pages of the 1531/35 Lectures on Galatians, where Luther 
famously frames Christian salvation in terms of ‘passive righteousness’ (iustitia 
passiva): 
For here we work nothing, render nothing to God; we only receive and permit 
someone else to work in us, namely, God. Therefore it is appropriate to call 
                                                 
15 Miller, Practice of the Body of Christ, 21. 
16 In a review of Putting on Virtue, John Perry wonders whether Luther is the implied ‘villain’ of the 
book (just as Erasmus is the ‘implied hero’), though Herdt has protested this characterization. See John 
Perry, ‘“The Essential Theatricality of Virtue”: A Review of Jennifer Herdt’s Putting on Virtue,’ 
Scottish Journal of Theology 65, no. 2 (2012), 217; and Jennifer A. Herdt, ‘Back to Virtue,’ Scottish 
Journal of Theology 65, no. 2 (2012), 224. On Luther and non-competitive agency, in addition to 
Putting on Virtue see Jennifer A. Herdt, ‘Affective Perfectionism: Community with God without 
Common Measure,’ in New Essays on the History of Autonomy, ed. Natalie Brender and Larry 
Krasnoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 34-41.  
17 Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus 
Nachfolger, 1883 - ), 6:244 (henceforth WA followed by volume number); the English can be found in 
Martin Luther, Luther’s Works (St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955 - ), 44:73 (henceforth LW 
followed by volume number). Where possible, English translations in what follows are taken from 
Luther’s Works, with a few alterations by the author. 
18 Passivity before God is already a key theme for Luther as early as the Lectures on Romans. See WA 
56:375/LW 25:365 (‘we are capable of receiving His works and His counsels only when our own 
counsels have ceased and our works have stopped and we are made purely passive before God, both 
with regard to our inner as well as our outward activities’) and WA 56:277/LW 25:265. See likewise 
the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (‘On the part of man… nothing precedes grace except 
indisposition and even rebellion against grace’ – WA 1:225; LW 31:11) and the Heidelberg 
Disputation (‘man must utterly despair of his own ability before he is prepared to receive the grace of 
Christ’ – WA 1:361; LW 31:40). For discussions of Luther’s theology of passivity see Oswald Bayer, 
Martin Luthers Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation, trans. Thomas H. Trapp (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), 42-3; Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit. Das 
Problem des Tertius usus legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche Parainese (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 24-27; and Simeon Zahl, ‘What has the “Lutheran” Paul to Do with 
John? Passive Righteousness and Abiding in the Vine,’ in The Vocation of Theology Today (Eugene, 
OR: Cascade), 61-74. 
. 
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the righteousness of faith or Christian righteousness ‘passive’… Without any 
merit or work of our own, we must first be justified by Christian 
righteousness, which has nothing to do with the righteousness of the Law or 
with earthly and active righteousness. But this righteousness is heavenly and 
passive. We do not have it of ourselves; we receive it from heaven. We do not 
perform it; we accept it by faith… Then do we do nothing and work nothing in 
order to obtain this righteousness? I reply: Nothing at all.19 
Here, as elsewhere, Luther appears to be doing precisely what Tanner warns against. 
Throughout this passage he is treating divine and human agency as if they operate on 
the same plane, arguing forcefully that for the former to do its work the latter must 
vacate the scene. Given Tanner’s account of divine transcendence and ‘non-
contrastive’ agency, what are we to make of this? Should Luther’s theology of 
passivity simply be dismissed, on the grounds that it is built around a fundamental 
philosophical and theological error in his understanding of agency?  
Although Tanner largely refrains from such direct polemics in God and Creation, 
other writers have not hesitated to press Luther on this point. In Harry McSorley’s 
otherwise sympathetic account of Luther on the bondage of the will, it is the issue of 
human soteriological passivity which bears the brunt of McSorley’s criticism. 
According to McSorley, in rejecting the scholastic distinction between absolute and 
conditional necessity – the distinction which undergirds the traditional scholastic 
explanation for the coexistence of divine foreknowledge and the genuine contingency 
of human free will20 – Luther is rejecting the position ‘not only [of] the Scholastics, 
but [of] all Christian thinkers as far back as Boethius and Augustine.’21 Otto Pesch – 
another interpreter sympathetic to Luther in other respects – makes the same 
argument: Luther’s view of the bondage of the will is shaped by the ‘fatal conceptual 
assumption… that whatever you attribute to human freedom must be taken away from 
God’s freedom’, thus putting ‘God and his creation on the same plane’.22 The idea 
                                                 
19 WA 40.1:41, 46-7; LW 26:5, 8. 
20 Traditionally this distinction is understood in terms of the difference between necessitas 
consequentiae (the necessity of the consequence) and necessitas consequentis (the necessity of the 
consequent). Hütter explains the distinction and its implications for contingency: ‘The classical 
illustration for this distinction is that of Socrates sitting or standing. When Socrates sits he sits, 
necessarily, as long as he is sitting (this is by necessitas consequentiae…), the reason being that it is 
impossible for him to sit and not sit at the same time. However, Socrates sits contingently, or freely 
(that is, not by necessitas consequentis), because it is always possible for him to stand. On the other 
hand, consider a puppet sitting on a chair. Unlike Socrates, the puppet must remain sitting on the chair 
until it is removed by another force… Hence the crucial difference between the two types of necessity: 
Contingency is excluded only by absolute necessity, not by conditional necessity’. Reinhard Hütter, 
‘“Thomas the Augustinian” – Recovering a Surpassing Synthesis of Grace and Free Will,’ in Dust 
Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 258-9; see also McSorley, Luther, 150-3. 
21 Ibid., 242. 
22 Otto Pesch, Hinführung zu Luther (Ostfildern: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 2017), 206-7. All 
German translations are by the author unless otherwise indicated. 
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that ‘God’s transcendence means that his work does not exclude free human action, 
and indeed grounds it, does not occur… to Luther.’23  
More recently, Reinhard Hütter has updated the charge, attributing Luther’s ‘inability 
to conceive of a non-competitive account of divine and human causality/agency’24 
first and foremost to a nominalist metaphysics of univocity rather than just a general 
failure to understand Aquinas’ account of contingency.25 Although Hütter does not 
cite Tanner, the substance of his argument parallels her account of divine 
transcendence quite closely:  
Only by embracing… the kind of metaphysics of being that was put aside by 
nominalism [i.e., a Thomist ontology of participation] would [Luther] have 
been able to conceive of God’s creative power as genuinely transcendent, as a 
power that can operate through necessity as well as contingency and thus can 
very well effect even the free choices of humans.26 
Because he either could not or would not embrace such a metaphysics, Luther thus 
‘went too far’ in his crusade against semi-pelagianism, making God ‘not merely the 
first and final agent of human salvation but its sole agent, with the human remaining 
purely passive.’27 The result, according to Hütter, is a profoundly dehumanizing 
theology: ‘in the act of conversion the human being has to be less than a human 
person, less than the creature to whom God has granted the gift of created freedom.’28  
Perhaps the most influential critique of Luther along these lines can be found in 
Jennifer Herdt’s 2008 genealogy of virtue ethics, Putting on Virtue. Herdt focuses on 
the implications of Luther’s view of passivity for the theological category of virtue, 
which she rightly understands to be difficult to reconcile with Luther’s polemic 
against theological appeal to human agency. 
At the heart of the book, Herdt engages in an extended critique of what she calls 
‘hyper-Augustinian traditions of reflection on the false character of human virtue’.29 
According to these hyper-Augustinian traditions, ‘the project of acquiring virtue is 
fundamentally dishonest… because it is a false and fruitless assertion of human moral 
agency.’30 Her constructive goal in the book is to move beyond these concerns to 
‘assemble a rough sketch of true virtue and its acquisition that… is free of this 
untoward inheritance’.31 Of particular concern to Herdt is the idea that ‘human agency 
must be abandoned’, and that the entire onus the Christian life must therefore be put 
upon God’s unilateral action in and upon the sinner, rather than on any form of graced 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 208. 
24 Hütter, ‘Grace and Free Will,’ 262. 
25 Ibid., 251-3. 
26 Ibid., 260. 
27 Ibid., 257. 
28 Ibid., 260. 
29 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 342. 
30 Ibid., 1. 
31 Ibid., 2. 
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cooperation. This approach, she contends, entails a fundamental discontinuity with 
‘ordinary moral psychology’, and with it the loss of ‘any sense that grace can work 
through ordinary processes of habituation’.32 
As the primary architect of the early modern protestant critique of virtue ethics, it is 
not surprising that Martin Luther soon emerges as the most important foil for the 
account of virtue that Herdt wishes to commend.33 Ultimately, Herdt finds Luther’s 
account of agency and its relation to moral transformation to be baffling. In particular, 
she cannot find a way to understand Luther’s ability on the one hand to claim that 
‘prideful human agency [must] be displaced by the indwelling Christ’, but on the 
other to affirm that good works do take place and that lives can in some sense be 
transformed, in the Spirit. ‘How’, she asks, ‘is a passive, displaced agency to be 
gradually transformed?’34 She finds this dimension of Luther’s thought ‘difficult… to 
integrate’,35 and ‘difficult to fathom’.36 Ultimately, Luther’s emphasis on ‘the 
bankruptcy of human agency… threatens the coherence of any account of Christian 
moral agency’.37 
Like other commentators, Herdt again diagnoses the source of Luther’s ostensible 
incoherence first and foremost in terms of philosophical presuppositions that result in 
‘[a] tendency to conceive of divine and human agency in competitive terms’.38 If only 
Luther had understood, like Erasmus, that ‘the exercise of human agency involved in 
the imitation of Christ is at the same time an indwelling of Christ in us and thus a 
human participation in divine agency’,39 then he would have realized that an 
Augustinian emphasis on divine grace and foreknowledge need entail neither a setting 
aside of human agency nor a rejection of Aristotelian concepts of virtue and habit.  
Thus in McSorley, in Pesch, in Hütter, in Herdt, and perhaps also implicitly in 
Tanner, we find variations on the same argument: that Martin Luther’s stress on 
human passivity before God, and with it his rejection of virtue-based accounts of 
Christian moral transformation, is subject to fundamental critique on the grounds that 
he has failed to understand that divine and human agency need not and should not be 
construed as a zero-sum game.  
In what follows I will argue that these accounts all fail to address what may be the 
strongest argument in favour of Luther’s account of passivity. The problem is that 
each of these critics assumes that Luther’s emphasis on the passivity of the human 
agent in salvation (and often in sanctification as well) is primarily or exclusively a 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 Herdt is mainly interested in Luther’s views on virtue in general, and Hütter is more focused on the 
specific issue of the initium fidei. Nevertheless, both focus their critical attention on Luther’s account 
of human passivity before God and its presumed philosophical presuppositions. 
34 Ibid., 188. 
35 Ibid., 184. 
36 Ibid., 188. 
37 Ibid., 175. See also 194, as well as Herdt, ‘Back to Virtue’. 
38 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 195, cf. 343-4 and 189. 
39 Ibid., 119. 
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philosophical position. That is, they assume that Luther developed his theology of 
passivity primarily through reflection on the omnipotence and sovereignty of God and 
the radical priority of grace in divine-human relations, and that his position therefore 
stands or falls with his conception of the ontological conditions in which these 
agencies operate. We see this above all in the assumption, especially clear in Herdt 
and Hütter, that Luther’s position on passivity is effectively refuted through the 
observation that divine and human agency need not be construed in competitive 
terms.40 
In fact, Luther’s position is sourced to a significant degree by a very different kind of 
argument, namely: empirical reflection on the experience of sin, including especially 
experience of the impossibility of mastering sinful affections like lust, fear, or anger 
through discipline, habit, or effort of will. Understood this way, Luther’s advocacy of 
passivity is only partially and secondarily related to the question of how to square 
divine omnipotence and foreknowledge with creaturely freedom, or to the character of 
divine transcendence implied in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Rather, arguably the 
most decisive reason God’s grace must operate over and against the rebellious human 
agent is that Christian experience shows sinful desires to be unmasterable and 
unpurifiable in any other way. In other words, Luther was convinced of the 
unfreedom of the human will not just through philosophical (or indeed exegetical) 
reflection, but to a substantial degree through analyzing his own experience of trying 
and failing to become more holy. The question of agency in relation to sin and virtue 
is thus to a significant degree a pastoral and empirical one for Luther, rather than 
simply a philosophical or metaphysical one. The remainder of this article will provide 
an exposition and defense of these claims. 
The Role of Experience in the Development of Luther’s Theology of Passivity 
There are two distinct but related features of Luther’s experiential arguments for the 
bondage of the will and the consequent soteriological passivity of the human agent 
before God: (i) exegetical arguments that God’s law is not obeyed where formal 
obedience to it is improperly motivated; and (ii) explicit appeals to experience of the 
insuperability of sinful affections and desires as a pastoral fact on the ground. In order 
to understand the latter, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the former. This is 
because Luther’s appeals to experience in defense of his pessimism about virtue make 
sense only in the context of his early focus on the moral significance of affect and 
desire, starting in his first major work, the lectures on the Psalms known as the 
Dictata super Psalterium (1513-15). 
                                                 
40 Herdt: ‘Absent Luther’s juridical framework for thinking of divine-human relations and his tendency 
to conceive of divine and human agency in competitive terms, his insistence that the starting point of 
the Christian life must be pure trust in God is no longer compelling’ (Ibid., 195). Hütter: Luther’s 
rejection of the distinction between two kinds of necessity is the ‘most consequential philosophical 
error’ in the treatise The Bondage of the Will, as a result of which his account of grace and agency is 
fundamentally ‘erroneous’ (Hütter, ‘Grace and Free Will,’ 258, 262). 
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First in the Dictata and then in the Lectures on Romans (1515-16), Luther 
demonstrates intense interest in the question of the purity of ethical motivation before 
God. As I have shown elsewhere, his primary way of framing ethical purity in this 
period is in affective and desiderative terms.41 It is a striking fact, often overlooked or 
underestimated in Luther scholarship,42 that when Luther speaks about the law, the 
gospel, and the bondage of the will in their relation to the human person, his most 
common strategy is to deploy a cluster of terms associated with affect and desire. 
These include regular references to the general category of ‘affections’ [affectus] as 
well as to specific affections like fear, anger, hope, and joy; various forms of desire 
language, especially concupiscentia but also appetitus, libido, cupiditas, voluntas, and 
desiderium; and more general language about ‘the heart’, which for Luther 
encompasses both affective and desiderative factors.43 We will see many examples of 
this practice in the next two sections.44 In observing Luther’s sustained and deliberate 
use of affective language in these matters, already we see evidence that Luther’s 
thought tends to take its primary orientation from practical experience as interpreted 
through Scripture. 
The Problem of the Impure Heart45  
After a number of years as a particularly scrupulous member of a particularly 
scrupulous monastic order, in the 1510s Luther still felt deeply anxious about his 
standing before God.46 At the outset of the Dictata super Psalterium, in his discussion 
of Psalm 1:2 (‘But his will [voluntas] is in the law of the Lord’), Luther’s attention is 
                                                 
41 See Simeon Zahl, ‘The Bondage of the Affections: Willing, Feeling, and Desiring in Luther’s 
Theology, 1513-25,’ in The Spirit, the Affections, and the Christian Tradition, ed. Dale M. Coulter and 
Amos Yong (South Ben, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017), 181-205. 
42 For exceptions, see Sebastian Degkwitz, Wort Gottes und Erfahrung. Luthers Erfahrungsbegriff und 
seine Rezeption im 20. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1998) and Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, ‘Die 
Affektenlehre im Spätmittelalter und in der Reformationszeit,’ in Reformatorisches Profil. Studien zum 
Weg Martin Luthers und der Reformation, ed. Johannes Brosseder and Athina Lexutt (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995). 
43 ‘The heart’ can have multiple meanings in Luther. In the examples that follow it refers to the seat of 
affections and desires in particular. Philipp Melanchthon parallels and interprets Luther’s primary 
usage of the term when in 1521 he defines ‘the heart’ as ‘the seat of all affections – love, hate, 
blasphemy, and incredulity’ (Philipp Melanchthon, Loci communes theologici (1521), trans. Lowell J. 
Satre (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), 47). For the complex case of voluntas, which can mean 
both will and desire, see Zahl, ‘Bondage of the Affections,’ 185-6, and Degkwitz, Wort Gottes und 
Erfahrung, 92. Illuminating here is Philipp’s Melanchthon’s equation in the 1521 Loci communes of 
the will with what he calls the affective or desiderative faculty (Vis, e qua affectu oriuntur), as well as 
the tight link he maintains between affect and desire (‘This faculty is sometimes called will, sometimes 
affection, and sometimes appetite’ [Hanc vim alias voluntatem, alias affectum, alias appetitum 
nominant] (Philipp Melanchthon, Melanchthons Werke II.1 (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1952), 
9; English: Melanchthon, Loci communes (1521), 23). Both claims reflect Luther’s own views in the 
period to 1521. For further discussion of all of these terms, with examples from Luther, see  Zahl, 
‘Bondage of the Affections,’185-8. 
44 I draw attention to such terminology by including the relevant Latin in brackets. 
45 The following three paragraphs recapitulate, with additional examples, an argument I make in Ibid., 
189-92. 
46 For an account of Luther’s Anfechtungen in this period, see Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road 
to Reformation 1483-1521, trans. James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1985), 76-82. 
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immediately focused on the high ethical standard implied in the Psalm’s description 
of the righteous man. According to Luther, we see in this verse – to which Luther 
returns again and again in these early years47 – that the good deeds of the Christian 
cannot simply be coerced through unrighteous motivations like ‘the fear of 
punishment [pene timoris] or… the hope [spe] of earthly gain’. Rather, to be truly 
virtuous such deeds must be ‘spontaneous and willing’ [spontanei voluntariique], 
‘cheerful [hylari] and free’.48 This is because ‘Christ does not want His rule to rest on 
force and violence… He wants to be served willingly and with the heart and the 
affections [voluntate et ex animo et affectu].’49 The upshot of this is that a deed must 
be rightly motivated if it is to be considered righteous in God’s sight – it is not just 
actions but the will itself that must be ‘in the law of the Lord’. 
In the Lectures on Romans a short while later, Luther continues to dwell on the 
requirement of purity of heart in obeying the law of God: because the law deals with 
‘nothing but love or the affections’ [non nisi de charitate seu de affectu], a given act 
of obedience ‘must be done… with the whole heart [toto corde], not with the fear 
[timore] of punishment in a slavish manner or because of some puerile desire 
[cupiditate] for comfort, but freely and out of love for God.’50 But now Luther seems 
to have greater despair. Interpreting Romans 3:20, Luther observes that ‘if we were 
righteous and good, we would consent to the Law with ready will [prona voluntate] 
and we would delight [delectaremur] in it, just as we now delight in our sins and evil 
desires [desyderiis… malis].’51 Instead, however, the further you examine your will, 
the more problematic it proves to be.52 Even if a person is not opposed to God’s will 
in their actions, they will still be opposed to it ‘in the heart’ [saltem corde].53 
By the time of the 1517 Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, this pessimism 
about human ability to fulfil the law has become formalized as a doctrine of the bound 
will.54 In theses 4-7, Luther argues that ‘man, being a bad tree [cf. Matt. 7:17], can 
only will [velle] and do evil’, that ‘It is false to state that man’s desire [appetitus] is 
free to choose between either of two opposites’, that the appetite ‘is not free but 
captive’, and finally that ‘without the grace of God the will necessarily produces an 
                                                 
47 See e.g., WA 56:237/LW 25:222-3; WA 5:33-5/LW 14:295-8; WA 2:412. 
48 WA 3:17; LW 10:13. See also WA 3:30; LW 10:32. 
49 WA 3:17; LW 10:14. 
50 WA 56:337; LW 25:325. 
51 WA 56:254; LW 25:240. 
52 ‘We so rarely analyze ourselves deeply enough to recognize this weakness in our will, or rather, this 
disease… [T]hose who are truly righteous… see that they have an evil will [voluntatem malam] and 
thus are sinful before God, but also they see that they can never understand fully how deep is the evil 
of their will and how far it extends’ (WA 56:235; LW 25:220-1). See also WA 56:237; LW 25:222-3. 
53 WA 56:237; LW 25:222-3. See also WA 56:201; LW 25:184. Here we see that Luther’s pessimism 
has moved beyond mere acknowledgement of the fact that akrasia can occur for the Christian and into 
a more fundamental pessimism about the will as such. On this basis, Saarinen concludes that there is no 
real concept of akrasia as such in Luther. See Risto Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and 
Reformation Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 115-32. 
54 See also the slightly earlier Quaestio de viribus et voluntate hominis sine gratia disputata (WA 
1:147). 
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act that is perverse and evil.’55 In theses 65, 67, and 68, Luther then glosses this 
general captivity of the ‘appetite’ in terms of the insuperability of the specific 
affections of anger and lust, from which it follows that human beings are unable to 
fulfill God’s law: 
65. Outside the grace of God it is indeed impossible not to become angry 
[irasci] or lust [concupisci]… 
 67. It is by the grace of God that one does not lust or become enraged. 
68. Therefore it is impossible to fulfil the law in any way without the grace of 
God.56 
From these examples we see that Luther’s growing despair over humanity’s ability to 
obey the law, and his corresponding belief that the will is not just weak but ‘evil’, are 
to a significant degree a consequence of reflection on specific ethical requirements he 
finds in certain passages in Scripture: (i) the requirement not just that God’s law be 
obeyed, but that it be obeyed for the right reasons (i.e., with cheerfulness and love 
rather than through fear or coercion), and (ii) the corresponding requirement that we 
desist not only from sinful acts but from sinful desires as well. Before God, Luther 
has come to believe, the heart and its affections rather than deeds are ethically 
primary, and it follows from this that God’s ethical standards – the standards on 
which salvation in the first instance depends – are impossible to attain through human 
powers.57 
It is in this context that Luther’s developing doctrine of justification by faith and 
theology of passivity must be understood. It is because of the impossibility of 
achieving anything remotely resembling the purity of desire required by God that 
Luther argues in the Heidelberg Disputation that ‘Free will, after the fall, exists in 
name only’ and that therefore ‘man must utterly despair of his own ability before he is 
prepared to receive the grace of Christ’.58 The sinner loves sin and hates the things of 
God. Human agency is impotent here; only the Holy Spirit can change the heart.59 In 
salvation, the human being therefore has nothing to contribute, and is entirely passive. 
                                                 
55 WA 1:224; LW 31:9. 
56 WA 1:227; LW 31:14 
57 These mutually-reinforcing convictions about the power of sinful affection on the one hand and 
God’s requirement of a righteous heart on the other are later formalized by Philipp Melanchthon into a 
full-fledged theological anthropology in which the will and the ratio are both dominated by the 
affective ‘power’. See note 43 above. 
58 WA 1:359-61, 207; LW 31:40. 
59 Cf. Luther’s later assertion that human beings ‘cannot possibly change their hearts by the power of 
their own nature without the grace of God…. Even though [a person] may go through the motions of 
doing good, these acts are nothing but lies, deceit, and hypocrisy’ (WA 7:355; LW 32:35); as well as 
Melanchthon’s comment in the 1521 Loci communes: ‘The Pharisaical Scholastics will preach the 
power of free will. The Christian will acknowledge that nothing is less in his power than his heart.’ 
[christianus agnoscet nihil minus in potestate sua esse quam cor suum] (Melanchthon, MW II.1, 16; 
Melanchthon, Loci communes (1521), 30). 
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As Luther puts it already in the Romans lectures, ‘he is freed not by his own powers, 
but by God, who acts while he is merely passive himself.’60  
Luther understood this theology of passivity to entail a rejection of Aristotelian ethics. 
As he famously put it, it follows here that the righteousness that saves cannot come 
‘by means of acts frequently repeated, as Aristotle taught’.61 What Luther appears to 
be referring to is Aristotle’s account in the Nichomachean Ethics of the necessity of 
action for the acquisition of virtue. According to Aristotle, because ‘like states arise 
from like activities’, it follows that ‘becoming just requires doing just actions first, 
and becoming temperate, temperate actions.’62 It is not that virtue itself consists 
merely in right actions – like Luther, Aristotle believes that the purpose of ethics is to 
form a virtuous person, not just to generate virtuous action63 – but rather that virtue 
can be formed only through actions.  
With the reference to ‘acts frequently repeated’, what Luther is criticizing is thus not 
the goal of Aristotle’s ethics, but the mechanism. For Aristotle, you begin becoming 
virtuous by performing virtuous deeds poorly, and then you gradually get better at it 
through a process of habituation over time.64 If you begin by doing the right thing for 
the wrong reasons, you are still on the path to virtue, because you will eventually be 
shaped into someone who does the right thing for the right reasons, at least so long as 
you have virtuous examples to imitate. Luther’s theology of the affections helps 
explain how it this principle in particular that Luther is rejecting in the Heidelberg 
Disputation and in the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology. Sin before God, as 
Luther understands it, simply cannot be overcome through ‘acts frequently repeated’. 
Sinful affections are too powerful. No matter how often you perform the right actions, 
the ‘heart’ maintains an effective resistance to such habituation, and the sinful 
affections remain. Thus for Luther the fact that ‘Outside the grace of God it is… 
impossible not to become angry or lust’ is proof that ‘We do not become righteous by 
                                                 
60 WA 56:277; LW 25:265. It should be noted that Luther’s concept of soteriological passivity is not an 
undifferentiated one. In later works Luther describes, for example, the ‘worship’, ‘remembrance’, and 
‘confession’ that are the proper response of the sinner who has been justified by God ‘freely out of pure 
grace without merit’ (WA 30.II:603; LW 38:107). The larger question of the relationship between 
passivity and good works in Luther is a complex one which there is no space to examine in detail in 
this article. At minimum it can be said that Luther’s understanding of Christian transformation and 
good works is always rooted in the theology of soteriological passivity described here, and in this 
remained opposed to virtue ethical accounts of Christian sanctification. For an account of how the 
proclamation of passive righteousness in early Lutheran theology was at the same time understood to 
produce real affective transformation, as well as a defense of the psychological plausibility of this 
account, see Simeon Zahl, ‘On the Affective Salience of Doctrines,’ Modern Theology 31/3 (2015), 
428-44. 
61 WA 1:364; LW 31:55-6. 
62 EN 1103b and 1105a. See likewise Aristotle’s use of the analogy of strength training to explain how 
virtue is acquired (1104a-1104b). English translations of Aristotle are taken from Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For an 
overview of the relation between action and virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics, see Michael Pakaluk, 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 98-
104. 
63 ‘[T]he just and temperate person is not the one who does [just and temperate actions] merely, but the 
one who does them as just and temperate people do.’ EN 1105b. 
64 See Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 102-3. 
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doing righteous deeds’, and that therefore ‘the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst 
enemy of grace’.65 In Luther’s view, the core problem with Aristotle’s position is that 
it is naïve in its optimism about the power of outward action to shape the inner 
person. One could spend years engaged in the right actions – as Luther understood 
himself to have been in his life as an Augustinian friar – and yet find sinful affections 
to be as insuperable as ever. 
It is important to note an interesting slippage that takes place here between political 
and theological ethics. As Theodor Dieter has pointed out, Aristotle and Luther’s 
arguments are somewhat at cross-purposes here. In developing his position on 
passivity, Luther is working with a late medieval theological framework that had 
transposed an Aristotelian moral system developed around political and social ethics 
into a Christian theological and soteriological realm that Aristotle never had in view.66 
This helps explain why Luther is so adamant that ‘acts frequently repeated’ cannot 
make the Christian righteous. Viewed from the perspective of divine judgment, 
Luther has come to believe that only an utter transformation of the sinner into a 
righteous person will do. The framework of Christian soteriology thus demands a 
moral transformation more fundamental and complete than the Nicomachean Ethics 
was intended to provide.67 This also helps us to see why Luther is willing in later 
works to grant the value of Aristotle’s ethics in the realm of civil righteousness. For 
Luther, it is only in relation to theological virtue that the problems arise.68 
The Sources of Luther’s Theology of Passivity 
The basic affective and desiderative shape of Luther’s developing doctrine of the 
unfree will in this period, and his corresponding affirmation of the passivity of the 
human agent before God and conviction of the ineffectiveness of the virtue paradigm 
where salvation is concerned, are now clear. But the question arises: where does 
Luther’s pessimism actually come from? Why does Luther think that sinful affections 
are not just powerful but ‘invincible’,69 that human motivation is not just 
compromised but ‘evil’ all the way down, and that sinful affection therefore cannot be 
significantly transformed through the mechanism of habituation?  
                                                 
65 Theses 65, 68, 40, and 41 of the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (WA 1:226-7; LW 31:12, 
14). 
66 Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum 
Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 168-70. 
67 Luther expresses this eschatological logic in the 1521 edition of the Defense and Explanation of the 
All Articles: because ‘nothing deficient can enter heaven’, it follows that ‘every disease and weakness, 
all spots, all wrinkles, and all such deficiencies must first be laid aside… if we are to enter heaven’ 
(WA 7:347; LW 32:30). 
68 ‘Aristotle and Cicero, who are the most eminent men in this class, teach many things about the 
virtues, and bestow superb praise on them because of their civil purpose; for they see that they are 
beneficial both in public and in private life. Concerning God, however, they teach nothing’ (WA 
42:349-50/LW 2:124, cf. WA42:505/LW 2:340, and WA 44:704/LW 8:171). 
69 See n. 93 below. 
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Part of the answer is Luther’s discovery around 1515 of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian 
writings, above all The Spirit and the Letter and Against Julian, which are quoted 
extensively in the Lectures on Romans, especially in the scholia on Romans 3 and 7. 
The Spirit and the Letter, in particular, reflects at some length on sin and the 
fulfilment of the law in affective and desiderative terms that are highly reminiscent of 
Luther’s approach, and Against Julian provides the primary basis for Luther’s crucial 
exposition of Romans 7.70 Another important part of the answer, as I have indicated, 
is the influence of the biblical texts Luther is preoccupied with in this period, 
including Romans 7, with its repeated invocation of the powerlessness of ‘the flesh’ 
to overcome sinful desire, the discussion of the will of the righteous person in Psalm 
1, and the discussions of good and bad trees and their fruit in the Gospels.71   
A third piece of the puzzle is Luther’s philosophical reflection on the topics of 
necessity, contingency, and predestination in light of scholastic terminology and 
debates. As we have seen, it is this piece that Luther’s recent critics have assumed to 
be so decisive. Important here is Luther’s discussion of necessity in the Lectures on 
Romans, where in his exposition of Romans 8:28 he rejects the core feature of 
medieval accounts of non-competitive agency, the scholastic distinction between 
necessitas consequentiae and necessitas consequentis.72 The presence of this 
discussion in this early text demonstrates that even if exegesis and experience do 
seem to have played a substantially greater role, philosophical debates about necessity 
and responsibility cannot be ignored in understanding Luther’s intellectual 
development on this topic. The fact that Luther repeats his rejection of the distinction 
twice more over the years, in thesis 32 of the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology 
and then again in The Bondage of the Will, underscores the fact.73 Analyzing the roots 
of Luther’s views about the will, recent critics, especially in the Anglophone world, 
have tended to focus on these philosophical factors.74  
But how important is this handful of philosophical discussions – one of which is 
simply a response to Erasmus’ appeal to different kinds of necessity – for the 
development of Luther’s theology of passivity? Clearly Luther is interested in the 
metaphysical implications of his new theology. But the fact of this interest is hardly 
evidence, on its own terms, that such interests drive his theology of passivity. Before 
                                                 
70 The definitive work on the influence of Augustine on the early Luther remains Dorothea Demmer, 
Lutherus Interpres: Der theologische Neuansatz in seiner Römerbriefexegese (Witten: Luther-Verlag, 
1966). In Demmer’s view, most of Luther’s insights in the Romans lectures can already be found in 
Augustine. What separates him from Augustine in the end is a stronger sense of the distinction between 
law and gospel, though he builds quite directly on Augustine to get there. See 242, 213-42. 
71 Matt. 7:17-18 and 12:33-35; Luke 6:43-45. This terminology is ubiquitous in Luther’s discussions of 
anthropology and grace in this period. See Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles, 172, 243. 
72 WA 56:381-3; LW 25:371-3. On this distinction, see n. 20 above.  
73 WA 1:225/LW 31:11 and WA 18:721-2/LW 33:192-5.   
74 In addition to Hütter and Herdt, see e.g., Robert Kolb, Bound Choice, Election and Wittenberg 
Theological Method: From Martin Luther to the Formula of Concord (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 28-31; and Knut Alfsvåg, ‘Luther on Necessity,’ Harvard 
Theological Review 108, no. 1 (2015), 55-8. 
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turning to this question, however, it is necessary to examine the fourth and most 
overlooked influence on Luther’s theology of passivity. 
Luther’s Argument from Affective Experience  
Crucial for understanding the source of Luther’s pessimism about affections and his 
corresponding critique of virtue ethics is a certain kind of argument from experience. 
Starting in the Lectures on Romans, in text after text Luther supports his views about 
the bondage of the will and the inability of human beings to fulfil the Law through 
arguments explicitly derived from his personal experience of the insuperability of 
sinful affections and desires. It would appear that much of the fuel driving both 
Luther’s particular focus on the above scriptural texts and his interest in affect and 
motivation, especially during the early period when he was still in the cloister, was a 
personal and pastoral frustration with the fact that he found himself unable, despite 
enormous effort, to bring his heart and his desires into alignment with God’s law or to 
cultivate the virtue he thought he had gone to the monastery to develop.75  
This dimension of Luther’s argument has been almost completely missed by the 
critics examined above.76 Luther’s rejection of ‘the attempt to act virtuously’ is not 
grounded in the first instance in a worry that such attempts are ‘essentially 
hypocritical’, as Herdt alleges.77 Rather, Luther rejects the virtue paradigm above all 
because such attempts simply did not work in his case. In other words, it is 
damnation, not hypocrisy, that Luther fears. Years of ascetic practice, community life, 
and prayer, under ideal early modern conditions for the production of virtue – a 
scrupulous Augustinian cloister – simply had no substantial effect in diminishing 
sinful desire that he could discern, and Luther feared for his soul. 
In the 1531/35 Lectures on Galatians, Luther describes these spiritual frustrations in 
terms of his inability over many years to develop any mastery over sinful affections:  
When I was a monk, I used to think that my salvation was undone when I felt 
any desires of the flesh [sentiebam concupiscentiam carnis], that is, any 
malice [malum motam], lust [libidinam], anger [iram], hate [odiam], envy 
                                                 
75 Herdt’s characterization of the psychological consequences of Luther’s theology of passivity as 
‘despair’, ‘paralysis’, and ‘obsessive self-scrutiny’ is deeply unconvincing (Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 
194-5). It is precisely these sorts of feelings that Luther felt himself to be freed from and consoled in 
through his new account of justification. For a similar observation, see Gilbert Meilaender, ‘Book 
Review: Putting on Virtue,’ Studies in Christian Ethics 23, no. 1 (2010), 102. Nimi Wariboko is much 
closer to Luther’s position when he characterizes the psychological and spiritual consequence of a 
unilateral understanding of divine grace in salvation as  ‘joyful play’. As he puts it, ‘Grace is a negation 
of work. But play is its style of negation…’ (Nimi Wariboko, The Pentecostal Principle: Ethical 
Methodology in New Spirit (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 
187, 183). 
76 Among these, Pesch alone appears to have reckoned seriously with the importance of experience in 
Luther’s theology. See Otto Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thoomas von 
Aquin: Versuch eines systematisch-theologischen Dialogs (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1967), 
935-48. 
77 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 2. 
  16 
[invidiam] etc. against any of my brothers. I tried many methods. I made 
confession every day, etc. But none of this did any good, because the desires 
of the flesh kept coming back [semper redibat concupiscentia carnis]. 
Therefore I could not find peace, but I was constantly crucified by thoughts 
such as these: ‘You have committed this or that sin; you are guilty of envy, 
impatience, etc. Therefore it was useless for you to enter this holy order, and 
all your good works are to no avail.’78  
Though this account is relatively late and benefits from hindsight, it does in fact map 
quite well onto what we have seen so far in the Dictata, the Lectures on Romans, and 
the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology – namely, that Luther’s growing 
pessimism about the will was connected to an increasing sense between 1505 and 
1515 that the heart, and not just actions, must be righteous in God’s sight.  
Although some commentators still fail to take this dimension of Luther’s developing 
theology into account,79 its importance is well established. Bernhard Lohse speaks for 
many in taking as read that Luther developed his newly pessimistic doctrine of sin 
during the period of the Lectures on Romans ‘partly through critical self-examination 
and partly through intensive study of Paul.’80 Berndt Hamm has recently reaffirmed 
the importance of Luther’s early spiritual struggles for his theology in some detail, 
arguing that ‘the first turning point of Reformation significance’ in Luther’s thought 
was the direct consequence of reflection on the ‘real history of the despair, 
disillusionment, and doubt’ that Luther experienced in the cloister between 1505 and 
1511.81 Gerhard Ebeling, Heiko Oberman, and Albrecht Beutel have all characterized 
Luther’s exegetical method throughout his life in terms of a complex reciprocity 
between Luther’s experiences and scriptural texts, in which neither can be reduced to 
the other.82 Indeed, Luther himself describes just this reciprocality already in the 
Dictata: ‘in tribulation [the exegete] learns many things which he did not know 
before; [likewise,] many things he already knew in theory he grasps more firmly 
through experience’.83 And it is dynamics like these in Luther’s thought that lie 
                                                 
78 WA 40.2:91-2; LW 27:73. See also WA TR 4:260/LW 54:334 and WA 18:783/LW 33:288-9. 
79 In addition to Hütter and Herdt, see also Alfsvåg, ‘Luther on Necessity’. 
80 ‘Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development, trans. Roy 
A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 248. See also Pannenberg, who describes the 
‘foundational’ role played by what he calls tentatio de indignitate in Luther’s theological development 
(Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘Der Einfluss der Anfechtungserfahrung auf den Prädestinationsbegriff 
Luthers,’ Kerygma und Dogma 3, no. 2 (1957), 110-11); and Kolb, Bound Choice, 28. 
81 Berndt Hamm, The Early Luther: Stages in a Reformation Reorientation, trans. Martin J. Lohrmann 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 44 and 33; the whole of chapter two is valuable (26-58).  
82 Gerhard Ebeling, ‘Lehre und Leben in Luthers Theologie,’ in Lutherstudien III (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1985), 9; Heiko A. Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil, trans. Eileen Walliser-
Schwarzbart (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 211-12; Albrecht Beutel, ‘Erfahrene Bible. 
Verständnis und Gebrauch des verbum dei scriptum be Luther,’ in Protestantische Konkretionen: 
Studien zur Kirchengeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 98-102. See also Eeva Martikainen, 
‘Der Begriff “Gott” in De servo arbitrio,’ in Widerspruch: Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Erasmus 
von Rotterdam (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 1997), 29. 
83  WA 3:44; LW 10:49. 
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behind Otto Pesch’s characterization of Luther’s approach to theology as ‘existential’, 
in contrast to the ‘sapiential’ approach of Thomas Aquinas.84 
Despite this widespread acknowledgement, to my knowledge the only comprehensive 
textual study of the category of the experience of sin in Luther’s writings is in 
Sebastian Degkwitz’s overlooked study, Wort Gottes und Erfahrung.85 Although his 
work is primarily descriptive rather than synthetic, Degkwitz does succeed in 
demonstrating beyond doubt the enormous importance of ‘experience’ across a wide 
swathe of Luther’s works. In what follows I build on Degkwitz’s work to show that 
reference to what ‘experience teaches’ constitutes a specific strategy of argument 
employed regularly by Luther in support of his theology of passivity up to and 
including The Bondage of the Will.86 
Particularly instructive here, as Degkwitz notes, are the glosses on Romans 7 from 
1515/16, where Luther repeatedly interpolates Paul’s descriptions of the internal 
conflict of the ‘divided self’ with references to ‘experience’.87 Three times in this 
passage Luther glosses St Paul’s statements about his knowledge of the ‘carnal’ self 
as knowledge derived specifically from experience: ‘For I know…through… the 
experience of contending against sin’; ‘So I find it… through experience’; ‘But I 
see… by experience’. 88 And once again the experience in question is above all that of 
sinful desires and affections, especially ‘lust’ [concupiscentia] and ‘hate’ [odio]. In 
the early glosses on Romans Luther clearly thinks that Paul is referring to his own 
experiences in support of his point about the power and persistence of sinful desire. In 
the scholia, Luther turns this into a formal method, arguing that we gain ‘knowledge 
of sin’ (Rom. 3:20) in a two-fold way, through ‘contemplation’ of Scripture and 
‘through experience’ [experimentaliter].89  
Luther then proceeds to take his own advice, repeatedly making appeal to his readers’ 
own experiences of sin: ‘if you do not believe the Scripture and its example, at least 
believe your own experience [saltem proprie experiente credite]. For through the Law 
you have deserved wrath and desolation’.90 Likewise: if only ‘the scholastic 
theologians’ had paid attention to ‘their own experience’ [experientia], they would 
have ‘recognize[d] the corrupt desires [pravas… concupiscentias] in themselves’ and 
the fact that ‘this concupiscence is always in us’.91 And again: ‘experience bears 
                                                 
84 Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung, 935-48. There are significant parallels between the argument 
being made in this essay about the development of Luther’s theology of passivity and Pesch’s 
contention that Luther’s is a fundamentally ‘existential’ theology. Certainly the latter would seem to be 
the case in relation to the theology of passivity, though it is beyond the scope of this essay to assess 
Pesch’s account of Aquinas’ theological method in relation to this. 
85 Cf. the pioneering though now very dated work, Hans Michael Müller, Erfahrung und Glaube bei 
Luther (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich, 1929). 
86 Degkwitz, Wort Gottes und Erfahrung, 85-105 and 147-56. 
87 Ibid., 88-9. 
88 WA 56:70-3; LW 25:63-5. The words in italics are Paul and the rest are Luther. The whole passage 
is highly instructive for understanding Luther’s burgeoning theology of experience. 
89 WA 56:254; LW 25:240. 
90 WA 56:291; LW 25:278. 
91 WA 56:275; LW 25:260-2. 
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witness [experientia testetur] that in whatever good work we perform, this 
concupiscence toward evil remains, and no one is ever cleansed of it.’92 In making 
such arguments, Luther is taking for granted that if his Christian readers honestly 
analyze their inner experiences and motivations, they will discover the same truths 
about sin and concupiscence that he himself has experienced.  
Reference to inner experience of the power of sin soon becomes a standard feature of 
Luther’s argumentation. In the 1518 ‘Explanation’ attached to the Heidelberg 
Disputation, for example, Luther explicitly bases his argument against the scholastic 
idea that Christians must merely do their best in order to be saved (facere quod in se 
est) on the experience of the insuperability of sinful affections like lust, anger, and 
fear:  
Let us stop this senseless talk and consult experience [experientiam 
consulamus]. Let anyone do what is in him while he is angry, irritated, or 
tempted… Why therefore do we grant that evil lust [concupiscentiam] is 
invincible? Do what is in you and do not lust [non concupisce]. But you 
cannot do that. Therefore you also do not by nature fulfill the law…. [D]o 
what is in you and do not become angry… Do what is in you and do not fear 
danger… Do what is in you and do not fear death. I ask, what man does not 
shudder, does not despair, in the face of death?93 
Here we see why, in Luther’s view, any model of Christian salvation that depends on 
even very minimal cooperation from the will is inadequate: experience shows that 
strong affections simply are not subject to such control, at least not when it counts.  
The same argument appears at various points in the treatise Against Latomus a few 
years later. Early in the treatise, Luther argues that we know sin and ‘evil desire’ 
[concupiscentia] persist in Christians because this is ‘our daily experience and that of 
all the saints’ [ipsa experientia quottidiana nostra et omnium sanctorum].94 Likewise, 
commenting on Paul’s description of the law of the flesh ‘making me captive’ (Rom. 
7:23), Luther asks, ‘And who does not sense that this is what happens in himself? 
Who never experiences [non… sensit unquam] these raging thoughts [irae 
cogitationes] and furious lusts [furiosas libidinis]…?’95 
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Luther makes repeated use of this argument in the various editions of the 1520/21 
Defense and Explanation of All the Articles as well. Arguing that Romans 7 describes 
the experience of Christians, Luther concludes once again with an appeal to 
desiderative experience: 
Let anyone try it for himself and find out! Let him fast, watch, labor even unto 
death, and be as holy as he possible can. Then tell him whether he still finds in 
himself evil desires [bosse Lust] and inclinations toward unchastity, wrath, 
pride, or the like.96 
And the same strategy is again employed in The Bondage of the Will: it is ‘manifest… 
from experience that man without grace can will nothing but evil’;97 ‘Ask experience 
how impervious to dissuasion are those whose affections [affecti] are set on 
anything!’;98 ‘Experience proves this [Et hoc probat etiam experientia]; for ask all the 
exercisers of free choice to a man, and if you are able to show me one who can 
sincerely and honestly say with regard to any effort or endeavour of his own, “I know 
that this pleases God”, then I will admit defeat…’99  
It is now abundantly clear that for Martin Luther one of the most important ways that 
human beings come to recognize the power and extent of sin is through experiencing 
their inability over time to master sinful affections like anger, lust, and aversion 
towards God’s commands. Altogether, these experiences seem to constitute, for 
Luther, a kind of empirical argument against the Aristotelian claim that just actions 
have the power to shape you into a just person. In Luther’s experience, this sort of 
habituation simply does not work for changing the core affections and desires at the 
heart of the disordered and sinful human will.  
Before concluding, there are two important issues related to Luther’s theology of 
passivity on which light can now be shed. First, we are now in a position to evaluate 
Harry McSorley’s conclusion that Luther’s ‘either-or thinking about the relationship 
                                                                                                                                           
desire to be ‘untamed’ in the Christian and yet no longer to ‘reign’? Some clue is given in a passage 
that echoes the spe/re distinction in Romans, where Luther argues that the manner of sin’s persistence 
in the Christian is quite precisely analagous to the Christian’s relation to death: ‘Sin is indeed present, 
but having lost its tyrannic power, it can do nothing; death indeed impends, but having lost its sting, it 
can neither harm nor terrify.’ (WA 8:92; LW 32:207) In other words, just as the baptized still die, but 
the ‘sting’ of that death is removed, so sinful affection still persists in Christians ‘exactly the same’ as 
before, only it neither damns nor condemns. The point here and throughout the treatise seems to be that 
there really is a pastoral and spiritual effect on the Christian that stems from the realization that in faith 
their sin no longer condemns – Christians really do live with a new kind of psychological freedom 
from the burden of the law’s condemnation that is different than their state before baptism – but that 
this must never be interpreted to mean that they have new powers over their sinful desires as such. 
96 WA 7:334/LW 32:22; see also WA 7:386/LW 32:54, and WA 7:115. 
97 WA 18:786; LW 33:293. 
98 WA 18:634; LW 33:64-5. See also WA 7:448/LW 32:93 and WA 7:145. Luther continues to make 
use of this argumentative strategy throughout his career, but it is his use of it up to and including The 
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99 WA 18:769/LW 33:265-6. See also WA 18:674/LW 33:122 (‘Scripture… prods him and seeks to… 
make him recognize from undeniable experience [experientia certa] how incapable he is of any of 
these things’). 
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of God’s and man’s will in salvation is the cause, not the result of, his refusal to make 
use of the distinction [between the necessity of the thing consequent and the necessity 
of consequence] in the question of predestination.’100 In McSorley’s view, the reason 
Luther does not appeal to secondary causation in his discussions of necessity and 
predestination in the Lectures on Romans and in The Bondage of the Will is that his 
thinking was already determined in advance by a univocal metaphysics that 
understood divine and human agency as a zero-sum game. Thus when Luther claims 
that, once the necessity of the consequence has been established, talk of the necessity 
of the thing consequent is simply ‘empty words’,101 McSorley concludes that Luther 
simply has not understood the concept of secondary causation.102 
Attention to the importance of experience in Luther’s theological method points to a 
different explanation for Luther’s claim. McSorley’s analysis appears to take for 
granted that the key issues at stake in the question of predestination and divine 
foreknowledge are moral responsibility and theodicy. The primary purpose of the 
distinction between the two kinds of necessity, as McSorley exposits it in Augustine 
and Aquinas, for example, is to explain how God can know all that will happen and 
yet not be morally responsible for evil that happens.103 For Luther, by contrast, the 
doctrine of predestination is not about the coherence of human moral responsibility 
before God. Rather, it is about pastoral consolation. Where McSorley wants to take 
what Pesch calls a ‘sapiential’ (objective, ‘God’s-eye’) perspective on the issue, 
Luther is in the process of developing what Malysz rightly calls an ‘actualistic and 
anti-speculative’ approach to theology that sets aside theodicy as an ‘impossible’ 
question.104 In this Luther’s comments on necessity exhibit the same anti-speculative 
impulse that is evident, for example, in his critique of theological attempts to gain 
knowledge of ‘the invisible things of God’ in the Heidelberg Disputation.105 
For Luther, the reason there is no ‘point’ in discussing secondary causation is that 
once you know that God is good and that he already knows in advance everything that 
will happen, then the pastoral function of the doctrine of predestination is already 
secure, even if the philosophical coherence of human moral resposibility is not. In 
other words, in Luther’s hands God’s determination of all things has become less a 
problem to be explained than a resource for ministry to the anxious sinner – the sinner 
whose actual experience of their own agential efficacy, Luther believes, is 
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characterized more by the unmasterability of sinful affection than by efficacious 
cooperation with God. From Luther’s perspective, the problem with a philosophical 
distinction that allows for co-inhesion and cooperation between human and divine 
agency is therefore not its theoretical plausibility, but the way it is ‘heard’ by the 
sinner who does not find herself able to overcome sinful desires through force of will, 
however graced. 
Luther’s rejection of secondary causation is thus better explained as a function of his 
pastoral and existential approach to soteriology, built on his own personal experience, 
than it is through his allegiance to a prior metaphysics. And this explanation is in fact 
stated clearly in the text: Luther frames his discussion of necessity in the Romans 
lectures as being about how to ‘preach correctly’, and then states that his ultimate 
purpose in the scholion on Romans 8:28 is to ‘give consolation to those who are 
frightened by these things’ and ‘to inspire hope.’106  
A second issue in Luther studies that is reframed through attention to Luther’s 
argument from experience is the question of whether and in what ways Luther’s 
critique of virtue ethics applies to the soteriology of Thomas Aquinas. In his book on 
Luther and Aristotle, Theodor Dieter has pointed out that Luther’s theology of 
passivity in the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology and in the Heidelberg 
Disputation is directed against a concept of natural human freedom prior to grace that 
can indeed be found in Biel and Buridan, among others, and which undergirds the 
scholastic principle facere quod in se est, but which is not present in Aquinas. For 
Dieter, it follows that Luther’s theology of passivity, in its early and most explicitly 
anti-Aristotelian form, is misunderstood when it is applied to the question of a virtue 
ethics that follows from, rather than precedes, the action of grace.107 Luther’s critique 
of the idea that virtue arises through acts frequently repeated thus ‘cannot be made to 
apply to Thomas’, for whom, in Dieter’s view, arguably even the earliest movements 
of the will towards God are graced.108  
Attention to Luther’s arguments from experience problematizes this interpretation. On 
the one hand, it is clearly the case in the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology as 
well as in the Heidelberg Disputation, as Dieter observes, that Luther frames his 
theology of passivity in relation to the powerlessness of the natural, ‘untransformed’ 
human being over ‘lust’, ‘anger’, and so on. The explicit reference point throughout 
the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology is indeed ‘man… by nature’ and before 
grace.109 However, if we pay attention to Luther’s experiential arguments about the 
unmasterability of sinful affection in the same period, both before and after these 
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disputations, we see that these latter arguments in support of the theology of passivity 
refer nearly always to the baptized Christian, not to the natural human being prior to 
grace. For example, when Luther interprets discussions of concupiscentia in the 
1515/16 glosses on Romans 7 as being about what we learn per experientiam,110 he is 
clearly talking about the Christian: the main force of Luther’s argument in the scholia 
on this chapter is that Paul is talking about ‘spiritual man’, not ‘carnal man’.111 
Likewise, in most of the examples discussed above it is his fellow theologians – 
baptized Christians – whom Luther urges to consult their experience. And ultimately 
it is Luther’s personal experience of the way that ‘the desires of the flesh kept 
returning’112 precisely while he was a devout Christian monk that helped spur the 
development of his theology of passivity and his critique of the mechanism of 
habituation.  
In Dieter’s argument that Luther’s critique of Aristotle’s theory of moral 
transformation does not apply to Aquinas, we see the danger of overinterpreting 
Luther’s formal philosophical and theological statements at the expense of the larger 
experiential context of his thought. The fact that Luther framed his argument about 
soteriological passivity in relation to the natural human person at key points does not 
mean that he thought the dynamics were fundamentally different for the Christian 
who also must learn all her life to trust in passive rather than active righteousness. 
Luther’s arguments from experience, like his many discussions of Romans 7, make 
clear that the intended audience for his theology of passivity is not restricted to the 
non-believer, but includes the ‘simultaneously righteous and sinful’ Christian.113 
Dieter’s claim that Luther’s critique of habituation through activity in the key 
disputations of the early period ‘cannot be applied to Thomas’ may thus be 
technically true, but only trivially so. 
Conclusion 
We can now see why, contrary to what a number of critics have maintained, Luther’s 
arguments about passivity and virtue cannot be reduced to a philosophical and 
metaphysical position on the relationship between divine and human causality. We 
have seen strong evidence that Luther’s theology of passivity, and his corresponding 
conviction of the bondage of the will to sin, developed in significant part through 
reflection on his own experience of what he understood to be sinful affections and 
desires. We have also seen that, as has often been recognized, the context for much of 
this reflection on experience was an exegetical one, in which Luther developed a 
method of reciprocal and mutually-reinforcing engagement between Scripture and 
experience. In failing to reckon with the role of experience in Luther’s thought, recent 
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critics of Luther’s theology of passivity have failed to engage with what Luther 
himself clearly considered to be one of the most persuasive features of his critique of 
virtue-based soteriologies. 
The argument that has been made here has several implications that can now be 
drawn out. First, and most importantly, it is clear that reducing Luther’s theology of 
passivity to metaphysical considerations is unacceptably simplistic. For all the power 
of Tanner’s account of non-competitive agency, like most purely philosophical 
accounts of historical developments it is misused if it is accorded too much 
explanatory power. Herdt and Hütter’s critical interpretations of Luther’s theology of 
passivity are elegant, consistent with a certain contemporary theological mood, and at 
least partially true. But they also display the procrustean impulse, common in 
theology today, to reduce the past 800 years of Christian history to an intellectual 
battle between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.114 To explain the core 
premise of Luther’s theological anthropology as nothing more than the 
philosophically misinformed deduction that ‘in order to secure God’s freedom, human 
liberty must be denied’115 is to ignore obvious complexities and counter-
interpretations to fit a narrative. The young monk’s growing conviction about the 
unmasterable force of sinful desire was first and foremost the product of an existential 
and spiritual agony, not an abstract philosophical deduction. Even where Luther does 
engage explicitly with medieval discussions of necessity and causation, his approach 
to the issue is shaped substantially by pastoral and existential considerations that 
appear to precede rather than follow from his understanding of the relation between 
divine and human agency in salvation.  
In this respect, the argument I have made in this article underscores the value of a 
methodological principle I have argued for elsewhere: namely, that attention to the 
role of emotion and experience in theological arguments – ‘the affective salience of 
doctrines’ – can be a particularly powerful tool for exposing and repairing the 
distortions that can arise when theological judgments are inadequately tethered to 
bodies and to history, including in certain forms of philosophical theology.116 In the 
present case, attention to the affective salience of the theology of passivity for Luther 
has thrown into relief a crucial dimension of his theology that recent critics have 
missed. 
Throughout this article I have drawn attention to the difficulties that can arise when 
Luther is viewed primarily or exclusively as a thinker shaped by metaphysical 
considerations. However, nothing that has been argued here is intended to suggest that 
Luther was not interested in metaphysical questions as such, or indeed that various 
metaphysical revisionings of his scholastic inheritance are not an important feature of 
Luther’s work. Theodor Dieter and Graham White have demonstrated the enormous 
complexity of Luther’s engagement with Aristotelian and nominalist traditions, 
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respectively, making it clear how difficult it is to reduce Luther’s engagement with 
his philosophical inheritance to any one simple narrative.117 Likewise, the profoundly 
metaphysical debate over the relative importance of ontologies of substance vs. 
ontologies of relation in Luther’s soteriology is ongoing, and stands close to the heart 
of the continuing controversy over the Finnish interpretation of Luther.118 What has 
been argued here, rather, is that a key dimension of Luther’s early soteriology, his 
theology of passivity, cannot be made sense of apart from Luther’s analysis of his 
own Christian affective experience. In our zeal to rediscover the metaphysical Luther, 
it is important to avoid overcorrection, lest we ignore the many dimensions of his 
thought that really are ‘existential’. 
A second implication of the argument I have made has to do with agency questions in 
theology more broadly. We see from the above that the question of divine and human 
agency can be at least partially disentangled, theologically, from the concerns about 
theodicy and moral responsibility that have often driven it. A crucial argument behind 
belief in the genuine contingency of human action is the argument that only so can we 
avoid making God the author of sin, and make sense of human moral responsibility 
before God. These are a considerations of great theological importance, both 
historically and systematically. However, to allow them sole or exclusive control over 
how theologians are to understand divine and human agency is to privilege moral 
philosophical reflection at the expense of the historical experience of the church.119 
Through the example of Luther and his critics, this article has given evidence that a 
strong privileging of philosophical and metaphysical reasoning in theology is itself a 
theological decision, to be defended or contested in relation to other kinds of 
theological argument rather than simply taken for granted. 
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But what of the actual content of Luther’s argument? During his life as monk, Martin 
Luther gradually came to believe that all Christians, if they are honest and attentive to 
their inner life, will recognize the unmasterability of powerful sinful desires as an 
empirical fact. Luther also came to believe that the view that soteriologically 
significant moral transformation could take place in a baptized Christian ‘by means of 
acts frequently repeated’ – i.e., through the mechanism of habituation through graced 
action – was likewise empirically false. This is what Luther meant when he responded 
to Erasmus’ plea for evenmindedness and common sense with the retort, ‘[T]his gouty 
foot laughs at your doctoring… [Y]ou are putting out fire with straw.’120 Once again, 
the parting of ways here is fundamentally about theological attention to experience: 
on the question of virtue, Luther argues that he has ‘tested these spiritual matters in 
experience’, whereas ‘Thomas… and all those who write and speak similarly’ have 
‘neglected this’.121 
A final implication of recognizing the role of experience in Luther’s theology of 
passivity is therefore that critics of Luther on passivity do have to reckon – as it seems 
to me the contemporary revival of virtue ethics in theology has not yet adequately 
reckoned – with the fact that Luther came to reject virtue ethics while living, praying, 
and working in a monastic context specifically designed for the cultivation of virtue. 
The assumption that the failure of late medieval monastic spirituality to ‘work’ for 
Luther and many of his peers is primarily explicable on metaphysical grounds is both 
a misunderstanding of Luther’s position and a serious underestimation of its force.122 
For Luther, Aristotle’s claim about the power of action to foster significant and 
durable moral transformation is one that can be tested in Christian experience, and 
which in Luther’s case was indeed tested, and found wanting. In light of this, Herdt’s 
judgment that ‘contemporary Christian reflection on virtue’ has now ‘largely… 
overcome’ many of the specific problems associated with ‘early modern hyper-
Augustinian’ anxiety about virtue, including worries about human agency, is 
premature.123 Until the experiential dimension of Luther’s argument is engaged on its 
own terms, the early Protestant protest against virtue has not yet been refuted, and the 
recent theological revival of virtue ethics is on less solid ground than it appears.124 
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and especially to the work of the Spirit in affective transformation can provide a compelling response 
to both concerns that is grounded in the long history of theological reflection on St Paul’s theology of 
the fruit of the Spirit. Rightly understood, a sophisticated theology of affect and desire can provide a 
persuasive account of how a theology of passivity like Luther’s involves real changes in bodies, and is 
thus neither ‘denaturalized’ nor ‘deracinated’, without having to postulate an overly optimistic (and 
therefore pastorally questionable) connection between outward action and inner moral transformation. 
For my own constructive position on passivity and Christian life, which draws on just such an 
‘affective Augustinian’ account of the work of the Spirit in relation to bodies, affects, and desires, see 
the chapter ‘Life in the Spirit’ in Simeon Zahl, The Holy Spirit and Christian Experience (monograph 
currently in preparation for Oxford University Press). 
